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ABSTRACT 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Some entities, members of the Ideological Superstructure, have the power 
to influence consumers taste and behavior. In doing so, fear has proven to 
be a very efficient tool to achieve their profit-seeking goals. The purpose of 
the thesis is to study fear as a market economy determinant and byproduct. 
I will follow an inductive analysis in which in Chapter 2 I will part from the 
individual and study how we shape our reservation prices.  This chapter 
will be based on Witte’s (1992) study on fear appeal theory and her 
Extended Parallel Processing Model and also on Caplin’s (2002). Later on 
Chapter 3 I will go into a broader scope and analyze the monopolist 
production decisions when faced with the power of shifting up demand 
with fear and its consequences on social welfare. Chapter 4 will analyze 
how competition on an oligopoly structure changes the overall picture. 
These last couple of chapters will present an extension of Dixit & Norman’s 
model (1978). I will try to show that even though fear is bare non ethereal 
information, it will have parallel effects as any corporeal pollutant and the 
problems aroused will be related in nature to the same type of market 
failures that are present on them.  
_________________________________________________________________ 
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1 
C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION:  
“For fear—that is man’s original and fundamental 
feeling; through fear everything is explained, original sin 
and original virtue. Through fear there grew also my 
virtue, that is to say: Science”.   
 
Thus Spake Zarathustra.  Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
What does the “voice on the street” has to say today? Every day we all go 
around walking, watching, listening, asking, just wandering through 
endless bits of information; hunting for data that might lead us to base and 
take our everyday decisions. Decisions regarding every single aspect of our 
socio-economical, individual and cultural life are based on our everyday 
digestion and analysis of this data. Evaluating any action, whichever its 
nature is, is dependent on a process of assimilation of information and 
further evaluation of it. In utilitarian terms, we could say that information 
helps us make a personal assessment of the utility that every single action 
may provide us and the risk we undertake when performing it.  
The more accurate information we have, the better production decisions 
we undertake and hence we face a bigger production possibilities frontier.  
Uncertainty, no matter in which stage of the production process it takes 
part, has to be considered as a cost. Information can help us leverage this 
risk and take better advantage of the inputs, lower the cost function we 
face, undertake better decisions regarding the market (timing, location …) 
etc. In this sense, information messages work as an asset or input within 
the production process and must be considered as such. Informative 
messages complemented by fear create externalities to people and hence 
some social costs arise due to this biased and distorted information. The 
costs that accurate information may be cutting out may be measured not in 
monetary units but on people’s life.  
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In this thesis we will be concerned on the effect that informative messages 
have on production and in specific our main concern will be that of 
fearsome messages. Fear is related to information since we base our 
worries on data we gather around.  There is no way we can fear something 
we are completely ignorant of. With this in mind we can realize that some 
informative messages are cause and origin of what we fear. In the present 
thesis we will be dealing with production of goods, and while doing so we 
will be analyzing the effect that the presence of fear as appended 
information has on them.   
Information is provided to us by the utmost institutions that constitute the 
social system. Pelikan (1995) divides the sovereign social system into three 
relatively separate systems: economic, political and cultural. One of the 
main purposes of these three systems is to provide information to the state 
population, in which we can all base our everyday decisions. We will be 
especially interested on how these different systems work in shaping 
people’s preferences and beliefs via the diverse messages they provide.  
Trust and reputation are imperative in the sociological cognitive and 
ideological process and these systems as represented by their main 
institutions have the power of having full reliance of the citizens. It is the 
case not because they are accurate in the production of data but because 
they were appointed and given the role by society as providers of info. We 
assume that since these systems and their main institutions are in the 
highest rank of the social apparatus they have access to the most accurate 
information. This makes us think that they have incentives to provide us 
with accurate information, when this might not be true. 
These 3 social systems at stake gather the main institutions of all the ones 
existent in society. The institutions that comprise the economical, cultural 
and political social systems are not only public but also private and lucri 
causa in nature. They have economic interests and are driven by the sake 
of gain. The economical system finds itself in a privileged role in 
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determining the fate of all types of institutions, because all the other 
institutions have financial needs and desire for profit.  Some big 
corporations with big budgets, constituents of the economic system, may 
be able to hire cultural institutions to provide them with the right channels 
to reach the consumer. By doing this, they obtain the same comparative 
advantages as any cultural institution.  
In addition, Pelikan points out, “The experience with the economic system 
is an important source of information for both individual and social 
learning”. With the economic system experience we evolve institutions (not 
only considered as lasting organization but also as choice constraining 
rules) that work out in near-to-biological terms. If institutions find 
profitable to use fear then this action may filter itself into the very core of 
institution’s behavior and choices. The economic system has a saying in the 
creation of preferences and beliefs as much as the cultural and political 
systems.  
The paramount importance of the process of getting information forced us 
to create institutions whose sole purpose was that of providing us with 
info. Cultural institutions in this matter find themselves in a privileged 
position since they were created precisely for that, to provide us with the 
facts from which we would construct our knowledge of. As a result we 
blindly accept the facts presented, and with them we base and erect our 
cultural norms, preferences and beliefs. The influence of cultural 
institutions in shaping preferences is more efficient since it is 
straightforward, in opposition to the economical and political system 
whose effect is more indirect.  
The political system has several forms of influencing preferences, beliefs 
and behavior of people, but we will just point out a couple of them. The 
main one is through the codified law, which enforces institutional rules and 
the second one, is through political discourse. Through these couple of 
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channels the political system sends messages whose intention is to provide 
people with information enough to direct people’s values and actions.   
These systems are interrelated; they interact and intertwine not only in the 
creation of values and social norms but also in shaping individual’s choices 
and viewpoints through the information messages they send. As much as 
they might be interrelated they still have economical interests and thus may 
find themselves in a position in which the constituent institutions will have 
to compete against each other in the quest for gain. Competition within 
these types of institutions takes a different dimension since they have the 
power to provide people with information and can take the information 
messages they send into consideration as a factor of production or as a 
demand determinant.  
Institutions such as Media, Church, Government, Financial and Goods 
Corporations characterize some examples of institutions representing these 
social systems. People have asymmetric information when compared with 
them and therefore they have to trust the data they obtain from these 
ideological leaders. Our rationality is bounded by the info they provide. 
Normally these constituent institutions are monopolies and they act as such 
in the production process of data. Therefore throughout the analysis of this 
thesis we will be assuming and studying this firm structure. 
As we stated before, these institutions can use information as an input to 
influence their demand and if there is any way in which they could raise it 
over rational limits to gain more profit, they will have no doubt in doing 
so. These institutions understand that fear is one of the best tools to modify 
the behaviour of its prospective clients. The power of fear resides in the 
fact that it can mislead the overall perception of things and thus rational 
consumers will not react as such anymore. The institutions we are speaking 
about are our source of information and hence they have the power to 
direct misleading and fearsome messages for their own benefit.  
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For any firm having an efficient factor of production and having a big 
amount of it might prove to be a relative advantage, and the case with fear 
won’t be different. Having the opportunity to influence ones demand 
through information and fear is a plus for firms. But in the case of 
information and fear as a factor of production how could we assess the 
overall quantity and quality of it? Undoubtedly, quantity and quality of 
information will depend directly on the strength and confidence that the 
society institutions might have. We will expect a country with strong and 
trustworthy institutions to be able to produce more and more believable 
(different from accurate or reliable) messages and at the same time we will 
expect strong and trustworthy institutions to be more efficient in scaring 
customers and influencing the demand through fear. 
Unfortunately for us •unlike social capital that represents the good use of 
information• the use of fear brings damages to society. Fear may be 
represented by mere non corporeal information but it has the same 
repercussions and effects than any physical pollutant and it must be treated 
as such. Misleading messages produce negative externalities just as any 
pollutant and should be subject to the same efficiency constraints.  
The main thesis’ objective will be precisely to study the vicissitudes 
emerging from non physical pollutants or more precisely from information 
pollution in the form of fearsome messages. I will try to show how societal 
stress will be a by-product from firms and market decisions and what 
effects this will have on societies’ overall welfare. Another objective will be 
to study the effect that competition will have on the level of fear and on 
welfare. Hopefully I will be able to raise questions whether fear is merely 
an accident or an actual deliberate constituent of the Economical System.  
The thesis structure will follow an inductive process; I will part from the 
specific to the general. In Chapter 2 I am going to analyze what variables 
intertwine and influence an individual economic agent’s foundation of its 
reservation price. A description of how this variables influence fear and 
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how fear itself enters into the agent’s valuation of a good will help us 
understand the psychological process we follow when deciding to 
undertake or not a preventive action in an individual and personal level.  
In Chapter 3 we develop a monopolistic model to show how institutions 
take their decisions regarding production and overall use of fear, when the 
monopolist has the power to influence the demand with its production 
decisions. We will be focusing on the effect that these decisions will have 
on welfare. In Chapter 4 we will generalize this model into an oligopoly 
frame to understand how the conclusions drawn in Chapter 3 might 
change under a competitive scheme. Finally in Chapter 5 we end up 
pointing out and commenting over some aspects and conclusions that 
might be important from the thesis.  
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C h a p t e r  2  
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: FEAR AND THE CONCEPTION OF THE 
RESERVATION PRICE 
“The news automatically becomes the real world for 
the TV user and is not a substitute for reality, but is 
itself an immediate reality”  
Marshall McLuhan - 1973   
Economics main focus has been diverted into the broadest representation 
of the economical process while forgetting the fact that economical 
decisions are taken and part from mere individuals; individuals whose 
rationality is far from being portrayed by the paradigm of rational choice. 
In my opinion, economical science should if not part from the individual 
scope into a general one following an inductive epistemological 
progression, should at least take into consideration the psychological 
aspect of individual decisions.  With this purpose in mind I appoint this 
chapter to a superficial analysis on how fear could influence the individual 
when deciding their reservation price for a good, and how institutions can 
manipulate this fear level. 
The theoretical model over which I will support my analysis will be closely 
based on Witte’s (1992) study on fear appeal theory and her well-known 
Extended Parallel Processing Model (EPPM) and on Caplin’s (2002). One of 
the main assumptions they both make is that individuals are able to assign 
a monetary value or a standard unit of measurement to every available 
health threat.  
Another important assumption Caplin and I make is that the agent at stake 
has no danger control processes (DCP) or resistance to the received 
messages. Witte (1992) defines this DCP as: “primarily cognition processes 
where individuals evaluate their susceptibility to the threat, the severity of 
the threat, their ability to perform the recommended response (perceived 
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self-efficacy), and the effectiveness of the recommended response 
(perceived response efficacy)”. What this means is that we could add up 
some variables such as education, intelligence, fear resistance, etc, which 
might be able to change individual’s susceptibility to be scared. However 
we disregard these variables since adding them up will not change our 
conclusions. Even if we all present some resistance, this will only change 
the level of fear we will be subjected to. We are all susceptible and victims 
of fear. 
Fear is undoubtedly an inter-temporal phenomenon and hence we have to 
account for this feature in our model of analysis. We will characterize our 
individual as having only two periods of life. The decision that the 
individual will face is either to take (referred as p) or not (referred as N) 
the preventive action and this decision can only be taken in the first 
period. It will influence the individual’s state of health in period 2 in which 
it will be either good or bad. The preventive action will have a cost for the 
individual equal to the price charged by the institution P > 0 in monetary 
units.  
 
A quick thought about the timeline could hint us that the time periods 
need not to be equidistant and also not quantified on fixed amounts of 
time.  The time elapsed from T=0 to T=1 might be very short or very long, 
the same will happen with the time form T=1 to T=2. We have also to note 
T= 0 T= 1 T= 2 
Institution creates
fear message 
Consumer values health 
threat and decides to take 
or not the preventive act at 
Dreadful event 
happens or status quo 
Time 
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that in reality because this time periods can be very distant from each other 
a lot of intermediate actions can be taken by the institution and also by the 
consumer.  The institution could for instance send more than a single 
dreadful message between periods of time.  
When examining the reservation price that we are willing to pay for the 
preventive action, we will take into consideration two elements. The first 
element is: a) the rational risk or actual danger assessment associated with 
the threat and, the second will be represented by b) the irrational element 
provided by fear which will magnify the reservation price. Both of these 
elements will be concerned and focused on the valuation of the health 
threat occurring on T = 1. The only difference being the fact that danger 
assessment is a rational full-informed valuation of the threat and the 
element given by fear will be an irrational add-in to the first element. 
Giving an algebraic representation to the first and rational element, we can 
state that under rational assessment of danger the preventive act will be 
undertaken iff the expected health benefit (Left hand side of 2.1) exceeds 
the cost of preventing it: 
2.1) Ρ≥Η− )( pN ββ  
Where Nβ refers to the probability or susceptibility of an individual to 
suffer from the health threat if it does not undertake the preventive action 
and conversely pβ refers to the probability when the individual prevents. 
Hence the difference between these two probabilities )( pN ββ − will give us 
a probabilistic gain or efficacy measure from preventing. 
In Caplin`s paper H refers to a non-biased and net discounted valuation of 
the health threat. Let us say that this valuation refers to the price we would 
in average pay in a future to get rid of the disease when the threat 
becomes no longer a threat but a real sickness or unpleasant event. In the 
case the threat can not be cured, it will signify a monetary compensation 
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that would leave us with the same level of utility also considering it in 
average terms throughout the population. Equation 2.1) hence can be 
explained as the price we would pay rationally (considering the actual risk) 
not to get sick in period 2, having to pay H either in monetary value or in 
utility terms.  
Once we have described the rational assessment of danger is its turn for 
the second element which will be fear itself. To get a grasp of the fear 
concept we might want to look to the definition that “The shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary” gives for panic. It states that panic is “a sudden and 
excessive feeling of alarm, usually affecting a body of persons, and leading 
to extravagant or injudicious efforts to secure safety”.  Witte (1992) 
defines it as a “negatively-valenced emotion, accompanied by a high level 
of arousal, and is elicited by a threat that is perceived to be significant and 
personally relevant”. Hence as we can see from the above definitions this 
second element while being a human emotion will lead us to act 
irrationally and assign an exaggerated valuation to the actual and rational 
danger.  
In economic terms, fear shall be treated as a non-excludable and a non-
rival good. Further up, it is not only non-rival but in times it turns to be the 
complete opposite of a rival good. The “consumption” of fear by an 
individual may raise the level of fear or “consumption” from another agent 
in contact with him. The possibility of creating a cascade-like reaction and 
expansion of mass panic when society is exposed to fear is always latent.  
The level of danger from preventing is given by Ηpβ ; the higher danger 
from non prevention (N) is given by ΗNβ . This couple of measures 
account for the expected health cost associated to the given choice of 
action. Fear as stated by the definition given above is an injudicious feeling 
of alarm or in other words an amplified outlook from the actual health 
threat hence, in order to simulate the effect we need to add a multiplier for 
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the expected health cost. Caplin (2002) refers to this multiplier as 
attentional multiplier and defines it as AN and Ap conversely for non 
prevention and prevention. Fear therefore is defined as: 
2.2)    
Η=
Η=
NNN
ppp
AF
AF
β
β
 
The values associated with AN and Ap should be both positive, since 
negative values are nonsensical.  
Caplin states that these attentional multipliers are dependent on two 
elements which are m, the message intensity and H, the health threat itself. 
AN and Ap are hence restated as AN(m,H) and Ap(m, H).  Some non-linearity 
issues might arise, we could arrive to a threshold in which the level of 
attention related to H will became too unpleasant to stand that the agent 
will not engage in preventive act. This inverse U-shaped response to fear 
was first hypothesized by Janis (1967).  For simplicity we will assume 
linearity but keeping in mind that it might well behave as an inverse U-
shape function. A person when faced with fear according to Caplin will 
engage in the preventive action iff the following equation is satisfied: 
2.3) 
[ ]
[ ] PHHmAHmA
PFF
ppNNpN
pNpN
≥−+Η−
≥−+Η−
),(),()(
)(
ββββ
ββ
 
Where P refers to the actual price of the preventive action defined by the 
firm or institution, hence consumption will be achieved if the left side or 
the reservation price construction is greater than P.  We refer to the 
element in brackets as the injudicious fear component of the risk valuation 
or the monetary increment of value derived by fear.  This component is in 
excess of and is added to the objective valuation of the risk by people. It 
represents the difference between the fear of not performing the preventive 
action and the fear of preventing it. As long as this fear differential turns 
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positive the person will be willing to spend more money on the preventing 
action than under an objective valuation.  
In simpler terms imagine that you value a vaccine for a dreadful virus. If 
you had all the information available and knew the real risks you will value 
it with Η− )( pN ββ . Now imagine that you are a normal being and have 
knowledge of what you listen. Under this panorama if you start listening 
that the virus leads to a very horrid and tortuous death and you get scared 
then you will be willing to pay more. This increase in the willingness to 
pay because of fear is what we imply by the expression in brackets. In turn 
we get a hint that an incentive to cause and manipulate this fear element 
might exist in institutions that have the power to do so.  If fear is to be 
present, a condition on the multipliers has to be considered and is the fact 
that: ),(),( HmAHmA pN > . 
Is precisely on these elements called and described by Caplin as attentional 
multipliers where I would like to expand and build up the analysis of this 
section and state which elements are under the control of the social 
systems I refer. As I have stated before, Caplin distinguishes between two 
elements that in his opinion determine the level of these multipliers: the 
health threat (H) and the message intensity (m). He makes the assumption 
that the more intense messages as well as worse health threats will make 
the danger more alarming.  This couple of elements embrace in a very 
general way the determinants of the attentional multipliers and I would like 
to take into account the variables that further determine H and m. 
H the health threat valuation is showed on Caplin`s paper as an exogenous 
variable whose value is already given just as if the valuation of health 
would be the same for everyone. If we all had the whole available 
information and no distorters of reality were present, we would be able to 
value the health threat objectively. This valuation should be equal to the 
exact monetary compensation that would drag us back to a starting utility 
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curve if the threat is materialized. This rational health threat pricing will still 
be assumed to be true but only in the rational danger assessment process 
(or the left hand side of the left side of equation 2.3).  
On the other hand in the injudicious element of danger assessment the 
valuation of the health threat can be influenced by fear and other elements 
and hence sticking with the former definition of H as unbiased will be 
useless. For this reason I will add an endogenous variable on the fear 
assessment called personal valuation of the health threat (h) that will take 
the place of H in the previous model in the right hand side. This personal 
valuation variable will consist on an exogenous part defined by H and 
some other variables that we will take into consideration later. Equation 
2.3) now should look like this: 
2.3b) [ ] PhhmAhmA ppNNpN ≥−+Η− ),(),()( ββββ  
A second determinant of the personal valuation for the health threat h will 
be the available income (y). We might want to reinterpret h as the net 
discounted individual, uninformed, biased and personal willingness to pay 
to get healthy. By making the assumption that people with higher available 
incomes will be able and willing to pay more to get rid of the threat we 
also assume that the relationship between h and y will be positive. It is 
important to realize that people with low levels of income might not be 
able to pay for the preventive act but still will have a utility loss due to fear 
or stress.1  
At this point we shall also note that any influence affecting h might be 
doing so through the discount rate which in the fear valuation procedure is 
also personal and might be distorted by the same elements that change h. 
Hereby we will assume that any variable that affects h might be as well 
affecting the personal perception we might have on the discount rate.  
                                       
1 This point will be further studied in the next chapter. 
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The valuation of the health threat is also dependent on the information we 
have on the threat itself.  In the face of ignorance people will measure and 
value new risks disproportionately higher than if they had all the relevant 
information. This tallies with Slovic`s (2000) statement that people show a 
disproportionate fear of risks that seem unfamiliar and hard to control.  
Hence a variable for the available information about the disease should 
come at hand; we will name this variable as knowledge ( k ). It will show 
a negative relationship with h, since as we have less knowledge we will 
value the health threat higher.   
The available information is interrelated and decided partly by the cultural 
institutions we are studying.  They have the power to decide which 
diseases to focus their coverage and attention to, therefore they could 
centre their aim at diseases for which the public available data is shallow 
and with this increase indirectly the public valuation of h. In order to 
differentiate the variables that depend partly or completely on the cultural 
institutions, we will use a symbol ˜ over the variable. Knowledge hence 
will be defined as ( k~ ).  
The personal valuation of the health threat consequently will be defined as 
a function dependent on the standard non-biased net discounted valuation 
H, on the available income y and also on the public available knowledge 
( k~ ), being this last element dependent up to a certain degree on the 
cultural institutions.  The algebraic representation of h will be given by:  
h ( )ky ~,,Η .  
The second element of the attentional multipliers (AN and Ap) to whom 
Caplin refers as message intensity (m) needs also to be further studied 
through the variables that determine the force of the message. The force or 
intensity of a message will be determined by two main elements: a) the 
content of the message and b) the saturation or constant repetition of the 
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message. The proper management of these elements which are under 
complete control of the institutions will be at the core of the preferences 
moulding phenomenon we are trying to portrait.  
As we can see from equation 2.3) in Caplin`s model, the message affects 
both attentional multipliers, he does not account for any difference in 
content or of message specialization. He assumes that a single message 
affects the awareness we have towards the events of preventing and not 
doing so, when in fact messages can be directed and specialized towards 
each of these choice valuations. This is what Witte (1992) assumes.   
Witte shows that there is the possibility to specialize and focus the content 
on each attentional multiplier separately. Witte in her paper speaks of two 
different types of messages each aiming to affect at a specific multiplier: 1) 
Threatening message aiming at AN and 2) Efficacy message aiming at Ap. 
Just for having a comparison parameter we are going to define a third type 
of message, an objective message. An objective message will have the sole 
purpose of informing and being fair about reality. It might be described as 
an impassionate message that will lead the public opinion into an accurate 
view of reality.  
The threatening message as explained by Witte (1992) “is focused on the 
severity of the threat (e.i., "Terrorism leads to an agonic death") and on the 
targeted population's susceptibility to the threat” (e.i., "You’re at a higher 
risk of suffering from terrorism if you are American"). This threat message 
is an external stimulus variable that in our case is assumed to be set by the 
cultural institutions and it will exist independently whether a person knows 
it or not.  
Accordingly, the efficacy message also exists as an external stimulus and 
leads to a personal belief of the efficacy of the undertaken measure. The 
perception of response efficacy refers according to Witte “to an individual's 
beliefs as to whether a response effectively prevents the threat (e.g., " I 
Societal Fear: Portrait of a Market Failure 
 
 16
think that if I stay at home I will not suffer from terrorism", or “If  X party 
wins, they will fight against crime”), and perceived self-efficacy refers to an 
individual's belief in his or her ability to perform the recommended 
response” (e.g., "I can easily stay at home and  watch TV", “I can easily 
vote for party X and prevent crime from happening”). In order to separate 
the different messages (m) according to their nature (threatening or 
efficacy) we will define them as Tm~ and Em~ . Similarly the objective message 
will be defined in same terms as Om~ . It will still keep the symbol ˜ since it 
will still be under the institution’s will to provide or not the objective 
message.  
The relationship between this three message types can be described and 
defined by the following statements: 
2.4)     ,...)~(,...)~(,...)~( EpONTN mmm Α>Α>Α  
In words, in the case of AN ceteris paribus an attentional multiplier affected 
by a threatening message will be bigger than one in which the institution 
has responsibly decided to act in an objective manner. In the same way an 
Ap affected by an efficiency message will be smaller or in other words, will 
create a false security feeling in the person compared to how it would have 
been if faced with an objective message.  
Here we can also realize why giving an objective message is not an 
acceptable stable condition. Parting from the fact that it represents exactly 
the same cost providing an objective message Om~ or a message with 
passionate content Tm~ or Em~ we can immediately recognize in the fear 
elements of our reservation price valuation that ceteris paribus: 
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A corollary we will arrive to, is that institutions will find it profitable not to 
act objectively. Passionately in the endless quest for profit they will direct 
their messages towards threat and efficacy up to the point where the 
marginal cost of producing a more intense message equals the marginal 
benefit.  
So far we have spoken only about the specialization of the messages into 
threat messages and efficacy measures, but we have not spoken about the 
magnitude or efficiency of the messages. The variables Tm~ and Em~ will 
present an increase of their influence on the individual’s attention as long 
as the content of the messages are more efficient in their purpose of 
threatening or showing the efficacy of the solution. This content efficiency 
will be supported by the right mixture of images, discourse, sound, 
attitude, medium, environment, etc. Threatening messages will be more 
efficiently supported by presenting alarming content in the form of vivid 
images, dreadful content, gory pictures, personalistic language, etc… 
Efficiency messages in the other hand will be more efficiently supported by 
images with relaxing content, exciting language, exacerbated optimism, 
etc… 
Threatening and Efficacy messages can be of a diverse nature, covering 
every imaginable human communication channel available. Advertising 
under this scheme is important as an information source but it is not the 
only one and certainly not the only one under study. We speak about any 
message conveying some sort of information to the consumer.    
As we stated previously in this chapter there are two ways in which 
cultural institutions can create a long lasting impression on their messages, 
the first is through the content of the messages and the second one is 
through the repetition of the message. Just as Sunstein (2003) states: “in the 
aftermath of a terrorist act, and for a period thereafter, that act is likely to 
be both available and salient, and thus make people think that another 
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such act is likely, whether or not it is fact or not”.  Both aim at increasing 
the significance and availability of the message, although we might say that 
the content is more efficient in making an event salient and the number of 
messages will be efficiently targeted into individual’s accessibility to relate 
to an event.  
The availability of a readily example is equally as important as the strength 
of the message since most of us assess the probabilities through the use of 
the so-called availability heuristics. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) refer to 
these situations as the ones in which “people assess the frequency of a 
class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or 
occurrences can be brought to mind”. This type of heuristics is a useful 
support for building up our experience since frequently the most repeated 
examples that come at our memory will be more probable as well. We use 
this type of heuristics in our everyday learning process and in procedures 
as simple as letting a ball fall. Imagine the unlikely scenario in which the 
first time we let fall a ball it went up instead of down as the gravity law 
specifies. Since it is the first time we do it and it is the only experience we 
have, we will value the probability of a ball going up as 100%. So, even 
though this is an exception on the real world, the individual doing the 
experiment will think that this experience will repeat itself with a 100% of 
probability. On life we follow a similar procedure while evaluating 
chances. We create our probabilities according to the available examples in 
our mind.  
Unfortunately not all life experiences can be lived at first hand through a 
personal available example and we need to rely on what people or 
institutions have seen and lived in order to reflect their experiences as 
ours. For this reason considering the frequency or number of messages 
sent by cultural institutions is important in our analysis. An example might 
be that since afro American people are more frequently portrayed as 
criminals on the media we might think that the probability of them 
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committing a crime would be higher than it really is. Repetitive messages 
depicted by institutions are prone to be considered more likely to occur 
than those that escape from their interest.   
A variable destined for the effect of the number of messages on the 
individual’s judgment of probabilities is at need and hence we will use the 
n with a symbol ˜ above (ñ) expressing that it is under the control of 
institutions. This variable should take into account the times a message is 
seen before the purchase decision has to be taken. It will specify the effect 
that each time has on the probabilities assessment. It shall not be mistaken 
as a discrete variable since this variable accounts for the effect on the odds. 
The frequency of the messages are also propaganda directed, hence a 
subscript T and E, comes at hand referring to threatening and efficacy 
messages repetition effect.  
Before moving on I would like to expand over a theory presented by 
Sunstein (2003) in which he explains how people when their emotions are 
intensely engaged will fall in something he calls as probability neglect. He 
states that “people fall victim to probability neglect if and to the extent that 
the intensity of their reaction does not greatly vary even with large 
differences in the likelihood of harm. When probability neglect is at work, 
people’s attention is focused on the bad outcome itself, and they are 
inattentive to the fact that it is unlikely to occur”. This possibility is also 
considered by Caplin in which he considers that in “the case of 
unconditional preoccupation (case where fear has created an obsession) 
there is the possibility that ever more intense messages become more and 
more productive in terms of the prevention incentive, by making it harder 
to avoid contact with the danger”.  
Therefore, when faced with an extreme fear engagement or obsession 
agents will just take either of two actions. One possible action might be 
avoidance; the moment the level of attention becomes too unpleasant to 
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bear the agent would be unwilling to perform the preventive act. This 
would be the same as saying that there is nonlinearity or there are marginal 
decreasing gains from the message impact after a thresholdF . This might 
be because the preventive act places them in such a close contact to what 
they fear that they might as well not engage on it. The second possibility is 
the one pictured by probability neglect in which agents will only take into 
consideration their personal valuation of the health threat (here 
denominated as h) and underestimate the probability of the threat 
occurring. This might even present returns of scale for the impact of the 
message. Hence the achieved outcome after this F threshold becomes 
quite arbitrary. It could lead people either to full rejection or complete 
obsession, with people engaging in the preventive action at whichever cost 
charged.  
In the case depicted above, that of an obsession with the threat, the agent 
will take the preventive act as long as his health threat valuation is greater 
than the price of preventing. Before we stated the fact that the valuation of 
one’s health is dependent on the knowledge we have about the threat. 
Since we are speaking about cultural institutions, that is, the institutions 
whose main purpose is to provide society with knowledge, we should 
appoint the task that these institutions’ messages have on knowledge. 
Knowledge k~  thus, is at a certain degree dependent on Tm~ and Em~ . In the 
above development and in the following I disregard any influence of 
Tm~ and Em~  on knowledge for simplicity but it is worthwhile to comment on 
it in this extreme case. The valuation and purchase when the agent is 
obsessed occurs as long as: 
2.6) ( )[ ] PmmkyHh ET ≥~,~ ~,,  
Leaving apart these extreme cases and now having described all the 
elements that form and affect our individual reserve price we can restate 
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equation 3) in order to analyze closely the repercussions that fear might 
have on individual economic agent’s behaviour. The modified version of 
equation 3) is restated as: 
2.7) [ ] PkyHhnhmAnhmA EEppTTNNpN ≥•−•+Η− )~,,()~),(,~()~),(,~()( ββββ    
With a glance at equation 2.7), it can be very easily seen how effortless is 
for cultural institutions and how many tools they have in order to move the 
consumer’s reservation price into their own benefit. Unfortunately for us 
we all are influenced and even we might say we are consequence of our 
own institutions. We are all very susceptible to their actions. We have 
stated a model with quite many degrees of freedom but this does not entail 
complete freedom to institutions.  As we have seen before, all individuals 
have danger and fear control processes that will enact in ourselves in order 
to level and try to control fear. In our model we underestimated their 
influence but they should be taken into consideration.  
Some relations can intuitively be drawn from the equation above. In first 
place we can notice that the relationship between ( Em~ , En~ ) and pA is a 
negative one. Since the messages are going to be efficiency focused, 
attention has to be diverted into a false security sentiment. The risk of 
getting the sickness when taking the preventive act pβ  has to become 
smaller in order to be worth undertaking the action. Conversely, the 
relationship between ( TT nm ~,~ ) and NA is positive. The reason for 
threatening is to exaggerate about the dangers of not undertaking the 
action, therefore NA will aim to provide a magnified perception of Nβ .  
We will also expect that Tm~ and Tn~ will at low levels increase the 
attentional multiplier NA and arrive into a maximum and then fall, 
following an inverted U-shape. This behavior is close in spirit to that of the 
studies by Janis' (1967) and Hovland et al., (1953) in which they proposed 
Societal Fear: Portrait of a Market Failure 
 
 22
an inverted-U shaped relation between fear and message acceptance. In 
the other hand we will expect that at high levels of efficacy in Em~ and 
En~ will asymptotically lead pA  to zero. This is the same as saying that high 
levels of efficacy will give the agent the sensation of being completely safe 
if undertaking the preventive act and thus driving pβ  to a very close value 
to zero.  
With these relationships we can illustrate several cases. First of all we can 
see how high levels of threat and low levels of efficiency will lead to 
rejection. This can be intuitively understood since high levels of threat 
might be causing some kind of avoidance of the fear and low levels of 
efficiency will lead pβ to a high perception level. We might also arrive to 
the rejection of the protective action with very low levels of threat and low 
levels of efficiency. 
Continuing assessing the relationships within the model we stated before 
that the message content m~ is more efficient in making an event salient 
and effect of the frequency of messages n~ will be efficiently targeted into 
individual’s accessibility to relate to an event. We might consider them as 
complement goods in increasing the attention of people, but there might 
be some types of threats for which harsher message content might place 
the fear levels quicker in a negative return zone. Examples of this kind of 
fears might be murders, presenting gruesome images and high threatening 
messages might lead to a rejection of the message at quite low levels of 
m~ . Since n~ is more efficient into making a threat available we would 
expect for this type of threats a low level of m~ and a high frequency of 
messagesn~ .  
In the other hand, there are some types of threats that are so common and 
which we can relate with ease that an increase in frequencyn~ will not bring 
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any significant improvement for the acceptance of the preventive action. 
Examples of this specific type of fear might be the smoking health threat 
which we can relate very easily and we have been flooded with all sorts of 
messages concerning it. In this type of fears we would expect a high level 
of m~ and lower levels ofn~ . This happens since these types of threats are 
so general that they turn faceless and a need to personalize it enhances the 
importance of the contentm~ . Recalling for ease equation 2.7) and 
considering that )~,,()( kyHhh =• : 
2.7) [ ] PkyHhnhmAnhmA EEppTTNNpN ≥•−•+Η− )~,,()~),(,~()~),(,~()( ββββ  
What might be some relevant socioeconomic implications of fear? Imagine 
that we are in an economy where there is just a single consumer, fixed 
level of income Y and a couple of goods. The first good is the preventive 
good which dynamic will be represented by equation 2.7) and the second 
good is any saving active. You are willing to buy a preventive measure for 
which you are willing to pay your reservation price as defined by PR (F).  
This reservation price will be influenced by the variables described under 
equation 2.7). The money you do not spend on the preventive measure 
will be saved for future consumption. The relation that ties all this up is 
given by: 
2.8)   ( )( ) YSyHkhnmP ETETR =+• ,,~,,~,~ ,,  
Intuitively it can be very easily seen that as long as the institution has the 
power to influence the reservation price it will be able to divert money into 
its own account; money that should otherwise be efficiently saved. This 
phenomenon should draw a lot of attention into growth issues, since it has 
been widely accepted the importance of an efficient saving rate for 
development. Strong cultural institutions with economical interests might 
be using fear as a tool to mould people’s preferences and with this create 
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economical inefficiencies through the savings rate. We can find some 
empirical evidence supporting this claim, we can relate to Slemrod (1988) 
on his inter-country study about differences in the saving rate due to fear 
of nuclear war.  
Another implication of the model might be found in bargaining issues. 
Being able to expand the reservation price of an agent, the institution finds 
itself in a unique position to expand the contract zone and get a better 
price for the preventive act good or merchandise that is being offered.  It 
should be noticed that the institution issuing the fear enhancer messages 
needs not to be the same one that is offering the preventive act. As long as, 
a firm ties his interests to the molding interests of certain institution then 
this firm will benefit from any action of the institution. In the case of media 
it becomes quite easy to do this since sending messages and media itself is 
open for any offer from the private sector.   
Holistically, imagine that instead of a firm being the one that is selling a 
good now it is a country. Countries with institutions so powerful to be able 
to influence the public opinion in other countries will be in a position as 
the one we have described above. They could be scaremongering the 
population of a fellow country in order to expand the contract zone for 
some of their goods or for some trade concessions. Fear enhancing 
messages need not to be sent directly from the government (although it 
could be) but instead through institutions that have the same interests. 
This may raise some answers and new questions according to how cultural 
institutions may influence and enhance the economy of a country. It is 
almost clear that if a country specializes in fear related goods (such as 
weapons, financial services, etc…) media is strong enough so as to 
transcend frontiers, earning income abroad and benefit also from the fear 
of the outsider population; they will both have common interests. Through 
fear, media will be gaining more and more international audience and also 
the country will be exporting its goods; and as seen from the model, they 
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will be obtaining a higher price for them due to fear. Supporting this idea 
we can relate to Herman (1986) and Chomsky and Herman (1979). This 
couple of researchers have published a series of substantial studies of the 
US mass media and their role in the foreign policy process.  
It is expected that stronger institutions will have the most influence on 
population and could benefit more from the fear process we have 
described. As we said before as long as an entity ties its interests to the 
molding interests of certain institution they will benefit from any action the 
institution undertakes since fear is a non rival good and we could find 
positive externalities and very probably a mutual positive externality.  It 
might not be completely an accident but more like a collusion of interest 
the findings of Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana (2002) in which they find 
that terrorism occurs more frequently in countries with powerful 
institutions.   
In this chapter we have seen how fear is used to modify the reservation 
price on individual economic agents and how this might lead to some 
socio-economical inefficiencies. In the following chapter we will draw 
some analysis over the process that a monopolistic institution will follow 
when deciding how much fear they should inflict to their product demand 
and what implications this process entails in the overall social welfare.  
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C h a p t e r  3  
FIRM LEVEL: MONOPOLIST DECISIONS REGARDING FEAR AND 
IMPLICATIONS ON WELFARE 
“In the state of nature profit is the measure of 
right”.     --.Thomas Hobbes  
“People react to fear, not love - they don’t teach 
that in Sunday school but it is true”.                                 
--Leonardo Da Vinci 
We value and create our perception of the utility of goods based on the 
information we possess concerning the use, quality and characteristics of a 
product. Information in this sense might work as a complementary good 
for some products. Any intake of info will enhance the sale of the good for 
which it is complementary of; in the same way that the sale of cars may 
enhance the demand for gasoline. But contrasting from physical 
complementary goods that usually are supplied by different producers, the 
production decision concerning info might be taken by the same firm that 
produces the good. This is the case of advertising and, in the spirit of what 
we have spoken so far, also from fearsome messages.  
Advertising in this sense might be defined as a source of information 
whose main aim is to influence the demand for a product in order to 
increase the profits of the producer. The spirit or objective of advertising is 
quite clear, the debate starts when we analyze and try to differentiate or 
generalize over the different types of information used in ads to fulfill its 
search for profit.  The content of information provided by advertising varies 
in nature, spirit and consequences they bring. An advertising message can 
embrace a wide range of content due to the few constraints that place a 
limit over it. An advertising message will, in general, say whatever the 
seller of a brand wishes with the aim to get an edge in the struggle for the 
consumer’s wallet.  
Jorge A. Macias Mora                                                University of Oslo 
 
 
 
27
In order to be consistent with the focus we have given in Chapter 2 
concerning cultural institutions, we must think in advertisement not only as 
a way of selling physical products but instead of selling any type of 
merchandize, idea, values or behavior. Institutions such as the ones we 
have been referring like religion, media, the political system, education 
system, etc not only sell products. The concept of advertisement should be 
extended to cover the way in which they promote their specific type of 
produce.  
The overall focus I am taking is consistent with Nelson’s (1974) view who 
also considers advertising as information. He distinguishes between two 
different qualities of the goods: search qualities, which are qualities that the 
consumer can determine by inspection prior to the purchase of the good 
and experience qualities, qualities that are not determined prior to the 
purchase. An example of a search quality might be the specification of a 
new laptop and an example of an experience quality is the taste of a soda. 
Because people can review the information prior to purchase when dealing 
with search qualities there will be greater incentives for misleading 
advertising or information for experience qualities.   
By doing this distinction we shall not forget that there might be goods that 
create utility for the consumer through both types of qualities. Misleading 
advertising in this case will more likely focus its attention on experience 
qualities of a good since they are the ones that could not be verified prior 
to purchase. Even though this is the case, search qualities are not exempt 
of being advertised through misleading information, especially since there 
might be costs related to the search of data prior to acquisition. The firm 
could exaggerate any search quality up to equalize the total costs the 
consumer had to bear to find out the truth. There are some cases in which 
getting the real view of the search quality is so expensive for the consumer 
that it pays to the firm to mislead him. 
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I will like to point out that we humans extract meaning out of a quite 
broad type span of symbols at a time. The de-codification of these symbols 
is what we will consider as messages. We could extract meaning not only 
of what is said, but also of  color, images, what is implied, what we feel, 
music, appeal, social roles, mood state of the seller, relationship between 
the characters, non-verbal language, subliminal messages, etc. Each of 
these symbols may represent an understated quality of a product, these 
codes we use are infinite and naming all of them is impossible. An 
advertisement normally does not only present information under a single 
defined and specific symbol, they usually sell the products with the help of 
a mixture of them. Because of this, throughout the advertising message 
mixture, the products showed will be represented and sold by its 
“experience” as well as “search” qualities.  
This thesis focuses on fearsome messages or fearsome advertisements. We 
can use indistinctly the term message or advertisement since we are 
considering them both as providers of information. As a first approach to 
the definition of a fear related advertisement we will state that it is a 
misleading ad that uses fear as its leading force. As a misleading ad and 
pulling some conclusions from the above paragraphs we would expect 
fearsome messages to focus more on experience qualities.  
Misleading advertising in general could be used to force the consumer to 
purchase a good. Once the consumer buy the good and experience it, he 
could realize that he was cheated and decide not to repeat the purchase.  
This might cause a decline in credibility for future advertising. The brand 
might get a bad reputation and hence the people that were not cheated 
into buying in the first advertisement may find out from the first costumers 
about the quality of the product. In this sense the opportunity cost of 
cheating for advertising firms might be quite high. Quality firms will have 
high costs of cheating. This rationale will lead some researchers like 
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Milgrom and Roberts (1986) to analyze advertising as a signal of product 
quality. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) as well as Nelson (1974) arrive to the 
conclusion that advertising may signal quality firms and products. 
Consumers get a hint of the quality of a brand by the volume of advertising 
and the expenses a firm undertakes while buying publicity. This aspect of 
advertising in Nelson words: “will help consumers by directing them to the 
better buys as determined by their tastes”. He arrives to the conclusion that 
this is efficient and it is worth the cost since if consumers where paying 
search costs for themselves to find about the quality of brands they will 
spend more funds overall than otherwise. This conclusion backs up the 
claim that even some slightly misleading advertising might be healthy or 
might make economical sense improving overall welfare.  
Unfortunately for us, the costs of cheating under this scheme will only 
work with verifiable characteristics, at least verifiable for the consumer. 
Once they try the product they can verify if the characteristics fulfill the 
expectative created prior or after the purchase (i.e. taste). You can verify if 
you like the flavor of a new soda by trying it the first time, if you don’t 
then you discard buying it a second time. 
 The messages we are conveying to, alas, allude to non-verifiable 
characteristics. If you fear something, you will not like to experience it first-
hand regarding experience qualities (you will not like to experience if 
anthrax leads to such a gruesome death as publicized) or in the other hand 
we will have to undertake huge amounts of money to find out the relevant 
search data to make an informed choice.  As an example of the latter, if we 
are offered a vaccine, we could go on searching for the data on the 
effectiveness of it, but, unfortunately labs treat this data as private and 
privileged info and would not give it away. Hence we will have to 
undertake our own research if we wanted to know the data beforehand. 
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This of course is not worthy and we will at the end trust and rely on the 
cultural institutions we refer to in the 2nd chapter, in providing us this data.  
As we explained before, normally an ad will present diverse messages 
through assorted codes and symbols. Therefore, even if a product presents 
a primary and key easy-verifiable search quality not subject to exaggeration 
or fear, seller may focus the fear related message to a non verifiable 
message code. A clear search quality may be the style of a dress, but the 
seller may focus on presenting the dress with a smiling gorgeous model. 
The consumer may decode the presence of the model as a symbol for 
success, social acceptability and happiness, three experience qualities that 
present threatening, efficiency messages 2 and non-verifiable characteristics 
since they are personal interpretations of social life. These codes might be 
even self fulfilling to the mere act of buying a product. The consumer may 
feel happy, successful and accepted just by buying the dress and then the 
promise of the seller will be proved to be true in the eyes of the customer. 
I will name as a pure healthy, objective and non-biased advertisement to 
the one that will focus only in providing the correct information regarding 
“search” qualities. Unluckily when we refer to experience qualities we have 
to place qualitative and non-objective adjectives to the description of the 
experience. These adjectives will be biased towards a safe-heaven rent 
seeking image of the product. Advertisement referring to experience 
qualities therefore will not be able to portrait accurate or objective 
information on the product and cannot be described as non-biased 
advertisement. 
Even if they can not be non-biased they might be cost reducing. As 
proposed by Nelson (1974) and Milgrom & Roberts (1986) they may be a 
signal of quality and reduce consumer’s costs and improve overall welfare.  
                                       
2 Following chapter 2, threatening since they might be decoded by the shopper in the form: “if you 
don’t buy, then…”, and at the same time efficient in the sense that they might be interpreted as an 
exaggeration of the real level of success, social acceptability and happiness. 
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This effect opens the possibility of allowing certain degree of 
deceptiveness, but this deceit is a second best choice. The best would be 
to be presented with the right information about quality without any deceit; 
this would be a pure informative advertisement. I will use the definition of 
pure informative advertisement as: an objective and non-biased ad that 
provides the relevant info to consumers without any exaggeration or deceit 
(throughout all the mixture of messages present in an ad) about the 
qualities of a product. 
The main difference I will point out between a non-biased advertisement 
and a fear related one is that fear will signify a cost to society and a saving 
to the firm that sends messages enhanced by it. Fear in this sense, works in 
the same way as a pollutant. Firms will have a negative cost from providing 
fear to society since the effect of their advertisement will be enhanced and 
therefore the social cost of it will be in excess of the private cost to the 
firm. Indeed, fear has been considered as a pollutant in the form of stress 
for a long time but very little attention has been drawn to it as a byproduct 
of the economic process and decisions.   
In this thesis, particularly on the subsequent chapters, I am going to focus 
solely on the negative side of fear in which the costs to society surpass the 
possible benefits. Although we must realize that as stated by Caplin and 
Kfir (2003) in certain cases such as AIDS, tobacco and alcohol the 
enhanced attention by fear may as well pay back. I am focusing on the 
case in which fear may increase demand for the product such as 
pharmaceutical and not the converse as in the case of tobacco.  
To understand a bit better the way in which fear will mean a saving for a 
firm; recognize that the costs of a firm providing a non-biased and a fear 
related ad are exactly the same; there is no significant difference in cost 
between them. Firms could enhance their sales by providing non-biased 
advertisement that would provide accurate information. Nevertheless, fear 
related ads will provide the firm with a higher attention level and therefore 
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will yield a higher level of sales than that of a non-biased3. The firm is 
obtaining more sales for the same price only due to the attention drawn by 
a threatening and/or an efficacy message in its ad.  
Societal fear represents a cost solely by itself. There are a great number of 
consequences that fear unleashes in any society and unfortunately most of 
the consequences have direct repercussion on human life and health. Fear 
will command persons into undertaking injudicious efforts to secure their 
safety. A parent may be concerned of letting her daughter visit a friend 
whose dad owns a gun, because the examples he can recall of kids dying 
by gunshots are salient for him. The same parent will instead let her 
daughter visit a friend with a swimming pool. This is completely irrational 
since more kids have died in swimming pools. A similar example was 
provided by the terror caused by 9/11; people quit using airplanes and 
instead decided to go by bus or car. The fully rational assessment of the 
statistical risk shows that there are significantly more chances of dying for a 
road accident than from a plane crash or terrorist attack. This irrational 
actions end into having more life loses than in the case we did not have 
the presence of fear. In the same spirit, irrational actions may also 
represent more than needed costs in other non-life threatening 
circumstances. 
When fear as a pollutant is added to the social pressure in the form of 
stress, it has very serious health repercussions in people. Lately the 
numbers of sicknesses that have been found to be related in certain way to 
stress have increased dramatically. Cardiovascular, psychological, 
gastrointestinal, respiratory problems seem to be enhanced by stress 
circumstances. Costs are not only directly related to the loss of life and 
security payments in the form of medicines, doctors, hospitals, death 
related expenses, but also have an indirect effect on work performance of 
the labour force. A stressed labour force will not perform with the same 
                                       
3 This effect has been explained in detail along Chapter 2.  
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efficiency as a content one, and this effect might be mistaken for lack of 
preparation or education of the workers.  
Another consequence by any means less important is the lack of trust that 
fear causes among the standard citizen and also in both the national and 
international investing spheres. If economic units fear each other they’ll 
end up with a lack of trust among them and thus no partnership could be 
formed. This lack of confidence expands against governmental institutions 
and leaks into the investing environment which is deeply affected. If 
society is flooded with fear from its cultural institutions this could lead to 
societal hate, or in a lesser scope, from certain groups of society against 
their own institutions. This can have quite a lot of repercussions, terrorism 
could be one. 
Fear unleashes human’s most primitive instincts; under panic we can react 
irrationally without measuring the consequences. Fear cause instability in a 
society and as Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana (2002) pointed out, 
terrorism tend to occur more frequently in countries with powerful 
institutions. Probably this relationship is not consequence of a mere 
accident but more a matter of coincidence of interests. Powerful institutions 
could benefit as proposed in chapter 2 with the use of fear; the consequent 
accumulation of stress could unleash terrorist acts, but also, terrorist acts 
would be weak without the huge scope of the promotion that these big 
institutions I have addressed give them. 
This long exposition over the consequences of fear aims at emphasizing 
the importance of understanding fear in every aspect of human life as a 
cost in itself and to measure fear consequences at its full and big 
magnitude. It signifies a cost to society as a whole and also for individuals; 
it also represents a burden for economical development and growth. To 
back up this claim I developed a model based on the one presented by 
Dixit & Norman (1978) to assess the welfare effects that fear understood as 
a societal cost might have.  
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We start defining the social welfare function, in which we will encourage 
the reader to forget the mere hedonic view he might have of utility but 
instead view it as proposed by Dixit and Norman (1979-80) as a “mere 
numerical representation of a preference ordering4”. The social welfare 
function will be given by:  
3.1)       [ ]ψµψψ −+= ),(),,( quyqyU     
The variable (q) will refer to the fear-related advertised good produced by 
a monopolistic firm. Variable (y) refers to the quantity consumed of all 
other goods and ( ) will be the quantity of fear related advertising. We will 
assume that the advertised product is a good and society will obtain 
positive utility out of the consumption of it. Fear-advertising  will be 
defined as promoting messages that will shift the demand through 
threatening messages.  In the social welfare function we will be assuming 
that the preference ordering of a product will be positively affected by the 
amount of advertisements and also from the fear level . The damages to 
society created by fear will be gathered into the social cost or disutility 
provided by [ ]ψµ 5.  
The social budget constraint will be determined by: 
3.2)     esPcqFy A =−+++ ψψ )(  
The production of the fear-advertised (FA) good will involve fixed costs F 
and constant marginal costs c per unit of output. The price of y which 
represents all other goods present in the economy is assumed to be 
normalized to 1 and e will refer to total resource endowment. The good q, 
could be advertised either by a healthy advertisement (HA) or by fear 
                                       
4 This definition was given after Fisher and McGowan (1979) criticized the accuracy of using the term 
utility when speaking about fear.  
5 For a premise on fear cost assessment we refer to Adler (2004) 
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advertisement, there are no significant differences in cost in providing 
either one of them. FA is more efficient in attracting attention to the 
product due to the fear element when compared to HA.  
The resource gain or saving represented by fear is given by 2 sources: first 
due to the increased attention6 to the ad through fear and in second place, 
the firm is not internalizing the damages that fear is causing to society 
represented by fear pollution or [ ]ψµ . These couple of effects produced by 
fear will cut the costs down for the firm. This marginal savings for the 
producer are assumed to be constant and equal to s . Fear is having the 
same effect in production as any pollutant. It is enhancing production 
through the use of an environment good while at the same time is not 
bearing the costs of distressing the milieu. The difference is that the 
environmental good is psychological rather than physical. Firms are using 
human mental capability boundaries to increase their awareness while 
distressing their sense of security. 
The consumer budget constraint which establishes that what consumers 
spend on consumption of the advertised good and on other goods (y) 
must not exceed the total endowment of resources in the economy: 
3.3)            y + pq = e 
For simplicity I will also assume a Cobb-Douglas type of utility function 
given by: 
3.4)     )()(),( ψαψψ qAqu =  
where 0< )(ψα < 1. This function will yield an isoelastic7 demand curve 
independent of the quantity produced q, but that will shift for any given 
                                       
6 Recall that in Chapter 2 we represented this increased attention through the so-called attentional 
multipliers.  
7 The elasticity of demand for this function will be given by [ ])(1/1 ψα−  
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level of . We assume that as we increase the FA level the elasticity for that 
product will decrease, hence we will make the assumption that 0)(' <ψα .  
From 3.1) and 3.3) we can obtain the inverse demand curve for the fear-
advertised monopolized good, which will be given by: 
3.5)     1)()()(),( −== ψαψψαψ qAqUp q  
Since this utility form will provide us with a broad array of demands, the 
maxima will depend on the proportional shifts in the demand curve as the 
fear level increases. The steeper the demand becomes the less consumer 
surplus the monopolist will absorb. The rationale behind this is due to the 
fact that advertising is typically associated with greater output, which is 
usually thought of as welfare improving. At the same time it also creates 
higher prices or price-cost margins, which will be welfare reducing.  As 
long as fear affects the steepness and increases the willingness to pay of 
people proportionally more than the negative effect of the increase in 
price, the welfare reducing effect will be decreased and consumer surplus 
may increase. This is why we will be interested on the proportional shifts 
from demand relative to .  
For a better understanding of the problem faced by the monopolist, a 
simplistic graphic representation taken from Chamberlin (1933) might come 
at hand.  
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The discrepancy from the demand curve for the institution’s product and 
the horizontal imposes upon the seller a price problem that would, under 
pure competition, be absent. In the case studied we are able not only to 
vary the price but also the product. Information being the product, we will 
be able to add more fear-intensity to it or decrease it at will. Complete 
equilibrium must consider stability with respect to both: “price” and 
“product”.  Starting to analyze Figure 1, think of the product variables as 
completely independent and fixed.  Line CC` refer to the curve of cost of 
production, the shape of it hints some scale economies of production that 
reach a minimum point at K and then raise again. DD` is the demand curve 
faced by the monopolist. The demand curve that a firm under a pure 
competition regime will face would be completely horizontal and the price 
and quantity produced would be equal to the points OJ and PC 
respectively.  This is the point in which consumers will have the biggest 
consumer surplus since the price charged will be exactly equal to the 
minimum marginal cost.  
In Figure 1 the cost curve CC’ crosses the demand in two points which 
means that between these points the monopolist will be able to obtain 
profits. In the case depicted the profits are given by BEHF, these profits 
aim to represent the point of maximum gain for these specific product 
qualities. For each product offered we will be able to find a price that will 
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maximize the profit of the monopolist, but in this case we are also 
searching for the most efficient product that will, over all the different types 
of products available, create the greatest gain. As we should already be 
used to, the maximum profit point, letting the product qualities fixed, will 
be given by the equality of marginal costs and marginal revenue, later 
represented in our model by equation 3.10). This condition will represent 
the equilibrium in price.  
Under the assumptions and statements made in Chapter 2 fear will be able 
to change the shape of the demand function. Product variation will 
normally involve a change in the cost function, which will represent a shift 
on the CC` curve up if the product becomes more expensive to produce or 
down if it becomes cheaper. In this case we are studying the difference of 
providing a fearsome message and an objective one. The use of fear will 
have the property to reduce costs thanks to the marginal savings from 
polluting with fear.  Hence the attraction of fear driven ads, they shift 
demand up at the same time as driving the cost function down through 
fear savings as described by sψ .  
So far we have assumed sψ to be constant but savings can change and 
affect the cost curve driving it down, accordingly with each level of fear. 
Consequently the decision of a monopolist will be to choose the amount of 
fear to maximize profit with the maximizing level of savings, price, and 
quantity. A monopolist facing this circumstance shall find the point that will 
provide them the greater profit given their power to influence demand and 
cost curve through fear, increasing area BEHF to its maximum.  
Analyzing the dynamics of the demand function when affected by fear we 
shall analyze the movements in price and in quantity. The vertical shift 
analyzing the change on price through fear will be determined by: 
3.6)    qq uup //log ψψδ =∂∂= . 
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The horizontal shift analyzing the change in quantity will be determined by  
3.7)    ))(1/()/(/log ψαδψ ψ −=−=∂∂ qqq xuuq  
As stated before a monopolist producer of the advertised good will select 
q and  to maximize its private return.  Monopoly profits will be 
described by the relationship: 
 
3.8)    [ ] ψψψ ψ )(),(),( sPFqcqpq A −−−−=Π  
 
The profit-maximizing values will be given by the FOCs 
 
3.9.1) and 3.9.2)   0),(),(
****
=∂=∂ ψ
ψδπψδπ q
q
q  
First, analyzing the equilibrium condition 3.9.1 for the demand function 
3.5) we find through a very simple algebraic treatment, the ever present 
relationship that states that marginal revenue should equal marginal cost: 
3.10)  )(ψα
cp =  
We can realize from 3.10) that there will be a fixed price level for each 
amount of  and consequently different values for q and y. Therefore in 
order to find the profit maxima for the monopolist we have to determine 
the level *, the level of fear that will be profit-maximizing.  Relationship 
3.10) reflects the association between p and  and will obey the dynamics 
described by the difference:  
3.11)   ααψθ '/log −== dpd  
In Chamberlin`s (1933) words “the problem becomes that of selecting the 
“product” whose cost and whose market allow the largest total profit, price 
being given”. Now we are able to define the effect of fear on the overall 
profits since we now can take as given the optimal level of pricing. With 
this we will round up the requirement of having equilibrium on both, price 
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and product.  This is possible in real life thanks to the daily experience 
institutions get by trying out different mixtures of messages. They obtain 
feedback and learn from the different responses of the market. 
Algebraically with the help of the envelope theorem and some simple 
substitutions we obtain: 
3.12) )( ψδψ sPpqdd A −−=Π  
The maximum level of profit for a monopolist will set 0=Π ψd
d and 
hence the monopolist choice of fear will be determined by equating: 
3.13)    )( ψδ sPpq A −=  
This would be the same as equating the marginal revenue of fear to its 
marginal cost. As we stated before, fear messages entail a saving for the 
firm due to its enhanced efficiency in attracting the attention of customers 
resulting in a lower marginal cost for fear ads. The marginal revenue thus, 
will need to be lower and for this the quantity has to increase.  Comparing 
result 3.13 with the result presented by Dixit and Norman (1978) for 
normal type of ads, we can see that fear messages in the profit-maximizing 
state will yield a higher level of production for a monopolist. At the same 
time we can intuitively see that8 ceteris paribus, the profits for a monopolist 
who uses fear enhanced ads will be greater than from one that does not.  
The savings might not be measured with precision but it is clear that out of 
a process of learning-by-doing cultural institutions have learned that 
frightening messages are more efficient in attracting consumers. Then, we 
can clearly see that the level of frightening messages will be greater than 
                                       
8 Just as we proponed in the relationship 5 in the second Chapter, where we concluded that it will 
pay off not to send objective messages. We proposed that fearsome messages would indeed 
increase profits.  
Jorge A. Macias Mora                                                University of Oslo 
 
 
 
41
that of the pure informative ones even though they may represent exactly 
the same monetary net costs.  
Equation 3.11) stated how the whole price equilibrium changed with the 
level of fear , conversely in order to see how the output equilibrium 
changes we obtain the comparative static derivative for output. This 
relationship will be obtained by differentiating the demand function and 
using some earlier definitions, thus we obtain: 
3.14)   )1/()( /log αθδψ −−=dqd  
From 3.14) we can see how equilibrium output will be increased with the 
presence of fear iff the increase in the demand price at the initial output 
level (given by ) is bigger than the price increase that the monopolist 
finds profitable (given by ). We assume that θδ >  so that increases in 
fear  lead to a higher equilibrium output. 
To finish our analysis of fear derived messages we have to answer the 
question: what implications have fear on overall welfare? For that, suppose 
for the moment that fear is fixed at an arbitrary level. Then the FOC 3.9.1) 
can be solved for q*( *), the profit-maximizing output level, given . Using 
3.1), 3.2) and 3.8), we can obtain a social welfare combination of (y, 
q*( *), ). 
3.15)  [ ] esPcqFquqW A +−−−−−= ψψψµψψψψ ψ )(*)(*)*),(*()*),(*(  
Every change in fear shifts the social welfare function. Keeping the 
standard of judgment fixed at an arbitrary level ψ  in )*),(*( ψψqu  and 
allow the actual level of  to change. We can find the change in welfare as 
determined by: 
3.16)  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] eqqqpquqW ++−−= )),(*()(*),(*),(**),(* ψψπψψψψµψψψψ  
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Differentiating 3.16) with respect to fear and keeping the second argument 
in )*),(*( ψψqu fixed at ψ to keep the welfare function static.  
3.17)
( )
[ ]{ } [ ] [ ]ψ
ψψπψµψ
ψψψψ
ψψψ
ψ
ψψ
ψ d
qd
d
qdpq
d
dqpqu
qW
q
),(*)(),(*)(*)(*),(*
...),(*
+−−−
=∂
∂
 
This equation will provide us with the effect that a small change in fear 
messages will have on welfare, measured according to levelψ . If we let 
ψ be equal to the profit maximizing level * . Being *ψψ = now, 
[ ] [ ] pququ qq == *),(*),(* ψψψψ and hence the first term to the right will 
drop, also in the profit-maximizing equilibrium we see that 
[ ] 0*),(* =
ψ
ψψπ
d
qd
and hence the last term will also be equal to zero. Then 
3.17) will become: 
3.18)    
( ) )()(*)(),(* ψµ
ψ
ψψµθ
ψ
ψψ
ψψ −−=−−=∂
∂
d
dpqpqqW  
Fear as previously defined is a non-excludable and non-rival bad. Being a 
feeling it has no physical representation, cannot be seen nor measured. As 
a feeling or mood, it can be reproduced or magnified by human 
interaction, turning it no longer into a personal feeling but into a society’s 
chain effect. People could turn into panic in the same way as insects turn 
into a swarm.  For effects of the present paper we will have as an 
assumption that fear will have an increasing effect 0)( >ψµψ  but declining 
over time 0)( <ψµψψ . Although as we explained the consequences can rise 
into a swarm or cascade catastrophe and the damage will increase as more 
and more fear is drawn into society.  
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It is important also to notice again that there might be some fearsome 
messages that may bring attention to important topics or threats and for 
which a quick and sudden response of the public is needed. In some of 
these cases the benefits of enhanced attention may outweigh the damages 
of fear.  The clearest example may be AIDS and the informative campaign 
based on threats to the general public.  
Continuing with the analysis, from the assumptions of the damage function 
and from equation 3.18) we can draw several interesting conclusions. 
Firstly, we can conclude that if the effect of fear is to increase price then 
0>
ψd
dp
and there will be negative gains in welfare due to advertising. 
From our previous discussion in Chapter 2 of how fear influenced the 
reservation price on people we can presuppose that indeed this will be the 
case and fear will enhance prices leading to welfare losses. If this is the 
case we could arrive to the conclusion that welfare will be improved by 
restricting fear messages below the profit-maximizing monopolist level. 
Note that the results that we are presenting in this chapter for monopoly 
can be drawn in the same terms for a full colluded institutional 
arrangement.  
Fear is a bad and as such it presents negative costs of production at zero 
cost, hence any producer of it will be running under a budget surplus. 
Letting the monopolist act under the rule of “the invisible hand” he will 
have an incentive to over-provide it. Unfortunately this overproduction of 
fear creates a disutility since it affects the whole population causing 
damages. These damages are not taken into account by the monopolist 
and hence the complete burden of them lay on the people. This is what is 
entitled under equation 3.18). The term )(ψµψ which refers to the marginal 
damage of fear represents a heavy loss on welfare. In the following chapter 
we will analyze if this can be solved by market competition.  
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Dramatically, fear can be accumulated by society and unfortunately this 
loss in welfare will be increasing as more and more fear is poured into 
society. Fear has also a time span of life that might last for quite some time. 
The monopolist institution might want to seed more fear before the 
attention drawn to its own produce from the last harvest of fear finishes. If 
this is the case (and normally it is) fear will accumulate and follow an 
exponential growth as it builds up. This accumulation process will 
obviously carry its own accrual of fear related damages, for which no one 
can be accounted for. 
In this chapter we have seen how a monopolist institution will react and 
which decisions it will take when having the power to scare and attract 
costumers through fear. We have also seen which the repercussions that 
fear might have on the overall well-being of society are. With no one being 
held to blame and the attractiveness of the savings represented by fear 
some other institutions might want to join and ride the scary train. An 
expansion of this model might come at hand for more than a single 
monopolist. The next chapter will expand the presented model for the case 
of an oligopoly institutional industry.  
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C h a p t e r  4  
INDUSTRY LEVEL: OLIGOPOLISTIC FEAR COMPETITION AND 
IMPLICATIONS ON WELFARE 
 “To found a great empire for the sole purpose of 
rising up a people of customers, may at first sight 
appear a project fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. 
It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation 
of shopkeepers, but extremely fit for a nation that is 
governed by shopkeepers”.                --.Adam Smith  
The present thesis aims at the study and behavior of Social Institutions, 
institutions that have direct influence on society’s culture and henceforth 
preferences.  A main premise for the thesis argument is the claim that these 
institutions compete against each other in an indirect way for the 
information-consumer’s attentiveness. We will assume that each producer 
within the group is a monopolist, yet his market is not isolated from those 
of his competitors. In the struggle, they will have no consideration in using 
any means. Just as firms that will no doubt in polluting and decrease costs 
to get the edge in the competition for the market, institutions will have no 
doubt in flooding society with fear while fighting for an audience. 
Institutions such as the Religious system, Media, the political system, etc 
behave as monopolist when providing their goods.  Even within 
themselves, (i.e. Media) each institution that comprise the system has such 
a high degree of differentiation that the economical structure that fits them 
the best is monopoly. Each institution directs its messages through its very 
own and specific channel, each transmitted message aims to differentiate 
the source from the others. They present the message with a specific color, 
tone, character, mood, environment, etc. The codification of symbols has as 
a main target to provide the institution with a personality and a 
personification. We all know that there are no 2 men alike; this will also 
apply and be especially true with institutions.  
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Before we start with the algebraical analysis and model in order to 
visualize and get a better grasp of the rationale of the problem and what 
we are expecting to find, a graphical analysis might prove quite useful.  
 
The curve DD’, just as in the previous chapter, represents the demand 
function for each monopolistic institution. It will describe the increase in 
sales that any producer could achieve by cutting prices given that all the 
other producers keep their’s fixed.  The position of DD’ will depend upon 
the number of producers in the industry, it will lie further to the right as 
there are less number of producers. The curve dd’ in the other hand 
represents the curve that will result if all the other competitors react and set 
their prices identical to him.  As Chamberlin (1933) states: this curve “will 
be a fractional part of the demand curve for the general class of product, 
and will be of the same elasticity”. It will represent a 1/n part of the total 
demand at the price. The curve CC’ still represents the cost curve that all 
producers are facing. An assumption we are making is that the costs are 
equal and constant to everyone, which in our case is an acceptable 
assumption.  
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Notice that as firms react to the shape of dd’ they will be tempted to move 
further to the right, decreasing the price and increasing the produce 
quantity. This will happen thanks to the lure of obtaining greater profits. 
This same incentive will lead the others to follow and curve DD’ will be 
the one actually occurring. The increased profits will lead other institutions 
to join and drive the curve d0d0’ down, till dd’ or to the tangent dotted line, 
with equilibrium conditions being given by QMPM, QOlPOl, and QMCPMC 
respectively. The first case depicts the case of a sole monopolist; the 
intermediate will be that of an oligopoly structure (which directly concerns 
us) and the last the one for monopolistic competition.  
From a close inspection we can realize that as far as we are concerned 
with prices, out of the structures studied, monopolistic competition will be 
the one that will provide the lowest price, followed by oligopoly and last 
by monopoly. Given that institutions assume their rivals’ amounts as 
constant, under oligopoly, equilibrium will settle somehow in between 
point E and D in Figure 2. The effects on quantity are somehow more 
uncertain since oligopoly may show an increase in quantity over the 
monopolistic competition case, as can be seen in the following figure: 
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As can be seen the equilibrium of oligopoly might lead to a greater amount 
of produce than under monopolistic competition dependent on the slopes 
and shapes of curves dd’ and DD’. Since the shape of DD’ will lay more to 
the right as there are less competitors it may agree with the actual 
arrangement of the cultural institutions we are studying. This arrangement 
might lead production to be greater and mistaken with a welfare 
improvement. If we associate a greater production with greater fear 
messages, following from conclusions in Chapter 2,  the overall production 
increase might prove to be welfare reducing.  Examples of this phenomena 
are shown daily on media. We can see how competition among a couple 
of big TV channels might lead to endlessly production of information 
around an event, with minute coverage and excessive detail. This irrational 
and masochist flood of info, eventhough it is increasing in quantity, when 
associated with fear and its side effect might as well not be welfare 
improving.  
In order to become an institution which could influence consumers’ 
decisions through fear it is needed to pool a huge initial investment in 
order to obtain the appropriate channels, size and repercussion needed. 
Big corporations might be compared and have the same effect as any 
institution since they are capable of hiring the channels needed to 
propagate its fearsome messages. With this in mind we can realize that in 
order to get the power we are studying it is needed a big investment that 
will work as a huge barrier to entry and will keep the numbers of 
institutions low. This may lead a case such as the one depicted in Figure 3 
to occur.  
The current chapter’s model will be based on Dixit’s (1979) and the model 
developed will follow a similar procedure as in the former chapter 
portraying the monopolistic case. It will be an extension from the former 
case monopolist case into an oligopolistic structure. We keep the same 
nomenclature definitions as in the previous chapter but now the subscript i 
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will refer to firm i’s output (q) and fear level ( ). Variable (y) still refers to 
the quantity consumed of all other goods. The utility function in the 
oligopoly case trails and expands equation 3.1): 
4.1)    


−


+= ∑∑
==
n
i
n
i
ii GquFyU
11
)(),( ψµψ  
Functions F, u, G and µ are assumed to be increasing. We assume 
concavity for u in q and also on U in (q1,q2,...qi)  At first glance we can 
realize that u(0, ) • 0, indeed u(0, ) = 


− ∑
=
n
i
G
1
)(ψµ . Thus even though 
there might be no production (or purchase) of the good, the sole presence 
of fear to enhance the purchase will cause a disutility or damage to 
society9. The function u, the utility function that represents the utility 
created by the data-production of each individual institution, will be 
assumed to obey the same assumptions as in Ch. 3 and to take the same 
form: 
4.2)   )()(),( iiiii qAqu
ψαψψ =  
This utility function shall be controlled by a consumer budget constraint: 
4.3)    eyqp
i ii
=+∑  
We are assuming that the price for other goods y is being normalized to 1. 
Parameter (e) refers to the total endowment. This budget constraint states 
that the money actually spent on goods must not surpass the total 
endowment of the economy. With the help of 4.1) and 4.3) we can find the 
inverse demand functions given by: 
                                       
9 This follows from a conclusion we arrived to in chapter 2, nevertheless a consumer might not raise 
its reservation price up to the level of purchase he will still experience a disutility created by the 
sole presence of fear.  
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Oligopolistic interdependence will arise and will be channeled through v. 
As v increases (either by an increase in production (q) or by an increase of 
fear ( )), F’(v) will decrease and therefore the inverse demand function 
that all the firms face will also decline. Some assumptions will be taken for 
simplicity. We will assume symmetry throughout the institutions that will 
be contending. They will provide the same price and quantity of their 
goods, the same fear level, and will face the same utility function for their 
goods: ),( ψqnuv = . We will further assume F(v) to be isoelastic and the 
goods offered substitutes, that is we assume 0)( <′′ vF  and ε−=′ vvF )(  with 
 > 0. 
In the same way we will assume that all firms face equal fixed costs F, 
equal constant marginal costs c, equal marginal costs of advertising AP and 
equal savings for sending fear related messages s . Social budget constraint 
now will be determined by: 
4.6a)     [ ] esPcqFy n
i
A =−+++∑
=1
)( ψψ  or assuming symmetry across firms 
4.6b) ( ) esPcqFny iAi =−+++ ψψ )(  
To understand the dynamics of the prices when the institutions change 
their production decisions it might prove useful to revise the following 
properties of the market structure: 
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The effect of a change inaugurated by any one seller might be spread over 
such a large number of competitors that the last term, represented by the 
cross elasticity between firms ( n
αε ), could be negligible for each firm.  
We are going to assume that this is the case either because there are a lot 
of institutions or because of Systemic blindness10. The cross elasticity 
between firms do not disappear in the aggregate industry, it adds on and 
have a direct effect on the whole industry, the effect on price by the 
aggregate production decisions of the industry will be given by 4.8).  
Equations 4.7 and 4.8 represent the elasticity of the dd’ and DD’ curve in 
our graphical analysis and we can realize that the former is more elastic 
than the latter.  
We have seen how prices change with the quantity, now assessing how 
the demand curves will shift as fear levels change. We will find again that 
the effects that individual institutions face and the general aggregate effect 
will differ: 
3.6) • 4.9) δβεδ
ψ
≈−=
∂
∂
−
n
p
i
i
log
log
 
4.10) βεδ
ψ
−=
∂
∂
−
log
log ip  
                                       
10 Systemic Blindness refers to a psychological phenomenon in which individuals can not foresee the 
repercussions that their actions are having on interrelated organisms throughout the system. 
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Equation 4.9) resembles 3.6) on the previous chapter which described the 
effect of fear on price by a monopolist and will be assumed to be equal or 
very proximal. This means that institutions are reacting as if they were 
independent monopolists. When assessing the vertical shift through 
equations 3.6), 4.9) and 4.10)  qq uu /ψδ =   and uu /ψβ = . With equations 
4.7) – 4.10) we can find the horizontal shift or in other words the effect of 
fear on the quantity produced, we notice that 
ψψ log
log
log
log
log
log
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
∂
∂ qp
p
q
. 
3.7) • 4.11) )1(log
log
α
δ
ψ −
=
∂
∂
i
iq  
4.12) )1(
)(
log
log
αεα
βεδ
ψ +−
−
=
∂
∂ iq  
From the last couple of relations we can draw the conclusion that 4.12) is 
going to be smaller thanks to a smaller numerator and a higher 
denominator. When all firms change their fear level at the same time, the 
demand of any firm will face a smaller effect than if a single firm changes 
the fear level while all the other firms stay put. All firms will react blindly 
thinking that they are facing 4.11) but when everyone takes the same 
measures relationship 4.12) actually occurs. The dynamics presented by 
fear are exactly the same as the ones that any product will face under 
advertisement as can be seen when comparing the model presented by 
Dixit and Norman (1978) with the results of this thesis. Nonetheless, the 
equilibrium that the industry will achieve and the implications on welfare 
will differ.   In order to see this we have that the profit for any firm will be 
given by: 
 4.13) [ ] ψψψ ψ )(),(),( sPFqcqpq A −−−−=Π  
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Differentiating equation 4.13 with respect to q and  we are able to find 
the following First Order Conditions, which consent with the ones we 
found in the previous chapter for the case of a single monopolist. These 
conditions are equal since we are assuming that firms are behaving 
noncooperatively.  
3.10) • 4.14)  )(ψα
cp =  
3.13) • 4.15) )( ψδ sPpq A −=  
Together with equations 4.4)-4.6) we can find the equilibrium levels for 
price, product quantity and fear level.  As stated from the graphic 
representation we will find a lower price and higher production than under 
monopoly but since fear is making the products appear more different to 
each other the price will be significantly higher than under perfect 
competition.   
The effect that fear has on price is akin to that of the previous chapter for 
monopoly and thus the term for the proportional change in the equilibrium 
price from a change in the industry’s common level of fear will be the 
same. At the end this is the same as stating that the whole industry is 
colluding and deciding as if they were a monopolist, hence it is not 
surprising that this expression is the same:  
3.11) • 4.16) ααψθ '/log −== dpd  
Expression 4.16) should be positive since we assumed thatα ’ < 0. This 
expression should be subtracted from -
ψlog
log
∂
∂ ip in order to obtain 
ψlog
log
∂
∂ p
and hence expression 4.12), the proportional change in output of 
each firm, will be given by:  
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4.17) )1(1
)(
)1(
)(
log
log
εα
θβεδ
αεα
θβεδ
ψ −−
−−
=+−
−−
=
d
qd
 
Conditions 4.16) and 4.17) tell us how the whole equilibrium and the pair 
of variables q and p change as the level of fear  switches. Expression 
4.16) appears unchanged relative to the monopoly case, which should be 
assumed by the equality with 3.11). Expression 4.16) however shows a 
difference when compared with 3.14). The overall change in quantity will 
be affected by the interaction between firms defined by the terms where 
the elasticity  appears. When together, the fear level of all firms who are 
attracted by the lure of increasing profits change, the shift on price is 
determined by 4.10) and not by 4.9).  The same happens with the quantity 
produced which will obey 4.12) and not 4.11).  
We can see that given the assumptions that we have made, specifically that 
(  > 0), we can notice that the denominator will be greater than in the case 
of monopoly and conversely the numerator will be smaller. This tells us 
that under the condition that the institutions at stake produce 
supplementary goods, the proportional shift in the demand as fear  
increases will be less.  
Now it is turn to sum up and analyze the effects that competition has on 
social welfare. Welfare will be represented by the following equation: 
4.18) [ ] esPcqFGquFyW n
i
A
n
i
n
i
+−++−


−


+= ∑∑∑
=== 111
)()()(),(),( ψψψµψψψ ψ  
Assuming symmetry 4.18 turns into: 
4.18b) ( ) ( ) ( ) esPcqFnnGqnuFyW Aii +−++−−+= ψψψµψ ψ )()()(),(  
We allow ψ  in F to stay fixed at a specified level in order to have a 
standard of judgment.  This equation specifies that social welfare in order 
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to be positive should account for the utility obtained by the consumption 
of the produced goods by institutions, and this in turn, should be in excess 
over the total costs incurred while producing them. Total costs must 
include the social costs caused by fear externalities. These costs will be 
represented by 

∑
=
n
i
G
1
)(ψµ . Function G allows us to study and to realize 
that there might be also interaction effects in the production of damages 
across institutions.  
Fear messages created by institutions might have complementary effects 
amongst them when it comes to damages. This might be the case when 
institutions try to take the opportunity to get on board on a fear upheaval 
or circumstance and make the most out of it by issuing paired and 
somehow related fearsome messages that will just increase public 
awareness. People, as intended, relate the messages and have an increased 
perception of the real danger11. Fear messages might also be substitutes in 
damage when they have counteractive effects. An example of the latter 
might be for instance that the fear of separativity that is sent in order for 
girls to get plastic surgery, can be counteracted with the threatening 
message advertised on media of the increasing risk of having troubles with 
the surgical procedure.  
The fact that institutions may have complementary or counteractive effects 
on damages do not necessarily connote that institutions’ products will be 
complements or substitutes across them. Institutions may add up for the 
overall public awareness of the threat but may still be direct competitors 
and their production may substitute for each other’s. For the moment we 
are going to assume that ε−=′ vvF )( and        ξssG =′ )(  with  ,  >0. The 
interaction effects intend that firms produce substitute goods but are 
                                       
11 An easy way of relating it to Chapter 2, will be that because of the increased number of messages,  
issued by institutions to compete against each other, the availability of the threat will be increased. 
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complementary in damages. Following up with the welfare analysis we 
differentiate 4.18b) with respect to . 
4.19) ( ) 


−−−−= )()(),(),(1 ψψγψψλψψ sPd
dqcqnW A  
The shadow prices ),( ψλ q and )(ψγ  are defined by: 
4.20) ( ) ),(),(),( ψψψλ quqnuFq q′=  
4.21) ( ) )()()( ψµψµψγ ψnG ′=  
They represent the shadow prices of the good and also the shadow price 
of the damage caused by fear. When we let ψ  be equal to the firms’ profit 
maximizing level, the shadow ),( ψλ q and the market price (p) match.  
4.22) ( ) 


−−−−= )()(),(1 ψψγψψψ sPd
dqcpnW A  
If we differentiate the expression for profit of the typical firm given by 
4.13) and use 4.16) we find that:  
 
4.23) ( ) )( ψψθψ sPd
dqcppq
d
d
A −−−+=
Π
 
Substituting in 4.22): 
 
4.24) 


−−
Π
= )(),(1 ψγθψψψ pqd
dnW  
 
Equation 4.24) shows us the main determinants of welfare under the 
scheme we have created. In first place, as long as fear contributes to 
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private gain, 
ψd
dΠ
will be positive. In equilibrium this shall be equal to 0. In 
the negative side, welfare will be lost from two different sides. First, fear 
will have a tendency to increase prices and hence reduce welfare. This 
tendency is represented by the term pq . In the other hand fear creates 
damage to society; this will be represented by the shadow price given 
by )(ψγ . Since we assumed symmetry n )(ψγ will represent the total 
damage caused by all the institutions.  
 
We must focus our attention on the determinants of this damage function; 
the shadow price is equal to ( ) )()()( ψµψµψγ ψnG ′= . We have assumed 
complementary effects between institutional threatening messages. The 
presence of complementary effects among institutions under competition 
will present greater damages when compared to a monopolist or a fully 
collusive scheme. To compare both cases we shall refer to its simile as 
represented by equation 3.18).  
 
The similarity though is misleading since the term 
ψd
dΠ
 present in equation 
4.24) refers to the common level of advertising by all firms. As stated by 
Dixit and Norman (1978), “this effect will be relevant to a fully collusive 
oligopoly equilibrium, but not directly to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium we 
have been considering”.  
We shall take into consideration the effect given by 
i
i
ψ∂
Π∂
 which as stated 
before is equal to )( ψδ sPpq A −− . Equilibrium occurs when this turns to be 
0 as given by 4.15). Using this condition along with 4.14), 4.16) and 4.17) 
we can find after simplification that 
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4.25) )(
)1(
))(1()(),(1 ψγαεαδ
δαεθβεαψψ ψ nsPnW A −


+−
++−
−−=  
Once more as in 4.24) the effect will be negative as long as the effect on 
price by fear  is positive and also if there are social damages as 
represented by the shadow price )(ψγ . These two effects will not be the 
only ones affecting welfare, now we have also to consider the interaction 
between institutions as represented by the terms affected by . After a 
close inspection of equation 4.25) we can see that we will have a stronger 
tendency to have excessive fear from a social welfare point of view in an 
oligopoly structure than under monopoly. This will be the case thanks to 
the interaction effects given by  and also by the term ( ))(ψµnG′  in the 
shadow price of fear, absent both in the monopoly case.   
Equation 4.24) refers to the fully collusive equilibrium. We saw that it is 
quite similar as the equilibrium we found under the monopolistic case, and 
in the same ways both will provide excessive fear. The internalization of 
the interaction effects and also the results presented by Dixit and Norman 
(1979) will make us conclude that collusion will yield a maximum average 
and total profit when compared with oligopoly.  Notice that collusion 
needs not to be in the production line but on the threatening message 
transmit. Collusion and thus maximum average profit can be achieved by 
sending the messages through the most efficient channels. Interaction 
effects are internalized in this case and maximum profit will be achieved. 
This possibility raises some interesting questions as to the power of certain 
institutions and information channels.  
This claim is related in nature to Haller and Chakrabarti’s (2002) study on 
comparative advertising wars. In this paper they analyze the effect that ad 
wars have on a noncooperative framework. They find that it might be 
possible under certain conditions that firms’ advertising efforts neutralize 
each other. They allow for a third party and find out that the only one 
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making a gain out of this war is in fact this third firm. Too many resources 
are spent neutralizing each other and in the end they arrive to the same 
conclusion, that a collusive arrangement will provide maximum average 
profits.  
Notice as well, that this just accounts for the efficiency on profits but not 
on welfare. Complementary interaction effects will still be affecting fear 
damages to society. Competition or increase in the number of firms will 
only accrue stress and social costs. With no one to be accounted as the 
culprit, these social costs will represent a burden to society and economy 
as a whole. We shall also realize that due to the international nature of 
some of the institutions we are studying, trans-boundary issues and costs 
may arise. Consider that due to the nature of the pollutant we are studying 
(information), it can be spread in an immediate way worldwide with the 
possibility of creating global damages. The opportunity that massive 
institutions have of being able to affect other countries’ demand for its 
products is without any doubt, a huge comparative advantage.  
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C h a p t e r  5  
CONCLUSIONS 
We have showed how fear in the form of threatening messages can be 
used by institutions that have this power as a distorter of the demand. 
Through the experience acquired by the day by day learning process, they 
have learnt how to use this power and cold-bloodedly they do. Fear or 
stress has been show to inflate beyond rational behavior the reservation 
prices we all have.  The tools we have pointed out as the ones used for 
this purpose by institutions were plenty.  
The first tool at their disposition is the full freedom on deciding the content 
of the messages. They can draw people’s attention into the threats that are 
least known (k) and hence the rational assessment of risk cannot be 
performed accurately. Within this freedom of choice, not only they choose 
the threat but also they can direct their informative messages towards two 
paths: to the efficiency (E) of the product against the threat and on the 
threat (T) itself. These messages, being of any type described above, can at 
the same time present a big intensity in the message (variable m). This 
variable will in turn make the message more salient.  A second variable 
used is the number of messages (n). Increasing the number of messages 
will make the threat or efficiency measure more available for the public 
mind, under the available heuristics approach.  
All these variables or tools at the full disposition of certain institutions are 
used to influence people’s reservation price and hence in a more aggregate 
level the overall demand the institution faces. With this in mind I found by 
extending Dixit and Norman’s (1978) model that under a monopoly 
structure the monopolist institution will use excessive fear from a social 
welfare point of view. This will be not only through the increase in prices 
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caused by the manipulation of fear but also from the marginal damage that 
it causes to society.  
We further extended the scope of our analysis and examined what would 
happen with welfare and efficiency on a more competitive frame. While 
analyzing an oligopoly structure we noticed that the drawbacks of fear not 
only were kept but increased substantially. The reason for this is that 
monopolists do not take into consideration the cross-effects that exist, both: 
with fear in the production process as well as with the current cross-effects 
on social damages.  
Some other conclusions can be made from the present thesis but I hope 
that the main aim of it was achieved. I hope it can raise questions towards 
the role of fear as an economical phenomenon and the consequences that 
this implies for society as a whole.  
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AFTERWORD 
“Since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we 
must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared 
than loved”.                                              –
Niccolo Machiavelli 
It is hard to understand fear as an economic instrument or even to fit it into 
a label that embraces all its characteristics. It cannot be considered as a 
“good” since it clearly represents no good to anyone, yet, people’s 
reservation prices may be affected and increased.  It cannot be considered 
as a bad either even though the utility of people seems to be affected by it. 
The common definition of a “bad” is a thing that consumers are willing to 
pay in order to get it removed or must be compensated to have it, in 
opposition a “good” is something you are willing to pay for. Fear, as 
studied under the present thesis cannot be completely fit for any of these 
definitions.  But as unclear an agent as it is, it is its ever lasting presence 
and influence what made me study it. Also uncertain and unexplored are 
the effects that it may have on the economy but it is clear, as showed by 
the present thesis, that certain institutions have the power and the 
incentives for using it. 
The overall effects that fear has are hard to assess since not only it affects 
the economy but goes deeper into the core of humanity. Actions taken by 
economical firms through fear not only may influence directly the economy 
but also will have repercussions on other spheres of human structure. This 
influence may be so strong that could be able to set changes and reshape 
society’s features and individual’s behavior. As a chisel, fear may be striking 
hard the marble giving it shape to what Hobbes called the Leviathan. 
Institutions may be institutionalizing fear and its effects, as a norm of 
behavior and reality. This is exactly what concerns me the most.  
Probably with a couple of examples I will make my point clearer. 
Blanchflower (1990) expresses in his paper the idea that fear to 
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unemployment depresses substantially the pay of workers12. Fear in this 
case increases misleadingly the perspective of unemployment by workers 
and makes them lesser their expectation relative to wages.  As another 
example, it has already been showed by Lenain, Bonturi and Koen that 
fear13 has had as a repercussion to create higher trade costs. In a world 
with increased globalization, more trade agreements, less political barriers 
for trade, and less opportunities of levying tariffs fear could be used as a 
barrier to entry, or a way to increase the costs of imports14.  As you can see 
fear can become with ease a control tool. The consciousness of these acts 
is what scares and should be subject of study. 
Under this possibility the panorama seems not very promising. Fear may 
enhance the profitability of firms but; at what cost? Does it pay back? Fear 
erodes trust and without any trust, no productive partnerships can be made 
between people. Trust is the cement that unites society, and it’s the core of 
social capital. The lack of trust leads to other social drawbacks like 
discrimination, hate, social resentment, etc. The spillovers effects of societal 
fear caused by institutions keep on and have full influence on the economy 
and on individuals’ “well-being”.  
Economics main concern is to increase the wealth of society as a whole. 
One of the greatest social scientists of our times, Amartya Sen, gave us a 
broader and nicer interpretation of what economists shall pursuit in their 
quest for the “well-being” of society through his “capabilities approach” 
and the increment of freedoms. He states that “the usefulness of wealth lies 
in the things that it allows us to do — the substantive freedoms it helps us 
to achieve”, this is quite a radical change of the merely accumulative, 
                                       
12 Blanchflower finds that “UK workers who say they expect their plant to close earn 12% less than 
those who do not”.  
13 They base their study on the aftermath of September 11th.. 
14 Leonard, J. (2001) even give measures of the effect, he says that the “cost of security inspired 
measures could amount to between 1 and 3 per cent ad valorem”. This data added to the findings 
of Limao and Venables (2001) in which they calculated the elasticity of trade flows with respect to 
transaction costs to be between -2 and -3% supports my worry. 
Societal Fear: Portrait of a Market Failure 
 
 64
shallow and superficial view in which we have focused our theories. 
Concerning freedom, he divides it in 5 main components or 5 distinct types 
of freedom: 1) political freedoms, 2) economic facilities, 3) social 
opportunities, 4) transparency guarantees and 5) protective security15.  
In my personal opinion Sen`s view on the last type of freedom (protective 
security) misses the fact that being “safe” is not the same and as important 
as feeling “safe” and is the latter concept the one that counts for “well-
being”. Fear intertwines and affects every single freedom on this list, 
directly or indirectly and in a big scale. It is even changing the rules from 
which our societies where traditionally based upon and restrict all the 
freedoms Sen refers too. Hence fear affects wealth in every single aspect 
explored by him.  
Fear is even changing the laws that rule and direct our society. Thanks to 
the “precautionary principle” isolated events or even the sole idea of a 
possible event which may cause fear to the public is able to end in a 
written law to prevent the events from occurring16. Not even scientific 
evidence is needed to legalize, under the shadow of this principle, law can 
very easily been manipulated under the presence of fear of a threat. 
Written law!  
Fear affects so many spheres of human life and well being. It represents 
factual costs for society (this is a fact) and a further theory development 
and research are needed on its effects in order to impulse normative 
measures to improve social welfare. Considerable effects of terror exist on 
a vast span of economic and social phenomenon and opportunities of 
research arise in every single one of them, theoretically and empirically.  
                                       
15 Sen, Amartya, “Development as Freedom”, ps. 10, 14. Anchor Books, New York, 1999. 
16 The closing Ministerial Declaration from the UN Economic Conference for Europe as stated by 
Sunstein  (2005) says: In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the 
Precautionary Principle… Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation”.  
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Probably the thesis at hand may seem very metaphysical and philosophical 
while dealing with human sentiments such as fear. This may be the feeling 
especially under the light of present mathematical and pragmatic 
economics where everything that is worth studying has to be subject of 
measure17. We are risking ignoring non measurable things such as values 
and feelings. Even if fear and other variables are not measurable they still 
affect economical results and welfare. Is the argument that something is not 
measurable, enough to ignore it? I doubt it and indeed in my humble 
opinion, Economics should come back to its roots and stick closer to 
Philosophy, Ethics and Sociology where this type of non measurable effects 
are considered.  
I hope this thesis feeds the inquisitive and restlessness spirit of some or any 
reader towards the effects of fear. Indeed, the effects of fear on economics 
may be so vast that I would not be surprised if in the near future we find a 
branch of our Science called Fear Economics.  
 
 
                                       
17 Some initial attempts to measure fear have been proposed recently by Adler (2004) 
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